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1. Introduction 
Local party systems in Western democracies are often characterized by the presence of so-
called independent local lists, which compete with the local branches of national parties in 
local elections (Aars & Ringkjob, 2005; Holtmann & Reiser, 2006; Steyvers et al, 2008).. 
These lists have long been considered as relicts of an old-style political system in which a 
non-political, harmonic conception of local self-government prevailed (Rokkan, 1966). 
Hence, they were often neglected or merely treated as a residual category in research on the 
party political offer in local elections (Hjellum, 1967). More recently however, independent 
local lists are given some more academic consideration as they seem to remain a 
characterizing feature of local party systems in Western democracies and their persistent 
presence and success is increasingly considered as an indication for the incompleteness of the 
party politicization process as envisaged by Rokkan (Aars & Ringkjob, 2005; Back, 2003; 
Kjaer & Elklit, 2010b; M.  Reiser & Holtmann, 2008).  
These independent lists are often considered as functional equivalents of local party branches 
for they occur in the same competitive electoral context (M.  Reiser & Holtmann, 2008). Yet, 
empirical evidence to support this functional equation is lacking as the extent to which 
independent lists actually behave like political parties is generally left nebulous. We could 
even suppose that independent local lists have a different understanding of local politics and 
behave differently than their national counterparts, as they are often associated with a non-
partisan conception of local self-government (Saiz & Geser, 1999; Steyvers, Reynaert, 
Ceuninck, Valcke, & Verhelst, 2008).  
Moreover, comparing the functional behavior of independent local lists and local party 
branches is further complicated by the altering role of local parties. Political parties have 
changed considerably in recent decades - both at systemic and organizational level – evolving 
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towards stratarchical organizations with a professionalized party center close to the state and 
increasingly autonomous local subunits (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Katz & Mair, 1994). As 
several authors have pointed to the occurrence of pseudo-local lists (Dudzinska, 2008; 
Göhlert, Holtmann, Krappidel, & Reiser, 2008; Steyvers et al., 2008), the presence of 
independent lists might be related to this general evolution towards stratarchical party 
structures.  
This paper aims to contribute to our academic understanding of the partisan character of 
independent lists in local politics by analyzing their organizational characteristics in the 
Flemish region of Belgium. Based on a convergent mixed methods design, I will assess the 
organizational complexity and organizational capacity of different types of non-national lists 
to develop a comprehensive and multifaceted understanding of the organizational strenth of 
non-national lists in Flanders 
1
.  
In the following sections, I will first outline the theoretical context of this research objective 
and then elaborate on the presence of non-national lists in Flanders. The methodological 
section illuminates the adopted mixed methods research design. The subsequent qualitative 
empirical part explores the organizational complexity of different types of non-national lists 
in Flanders and the co-occurrence of formal and informal organizational arrangements. A 
quantitative section analyzes the organizational capacity of these different types of non-
national lists. In a concluding section, the research findings are interpreted from a theoretical 
perspective and some suggestions for further research are formulated.  
                                                          
1
 This paper is part of a broader research project which aims to establish the partisan character of non-national 
lists by analyzing to extend to which they assume the functions traditionally associated with local parties.  
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2. Local party organizations and the decline of parties 
While national party organization has attracted growing academic attention in recent decades, 
the organizational features of local parties have received far less academic interest. If 
considered at all, local parties are commonly interpreted as mere sub-units of national parties, 
forming the gateway for new party members to enter the party. Hence, local party branches 
geographically organize the national party-on-the-ground. In recent decades however, the role 
of this party on the ground has changed drastically in developing party organizations. Katz 
and Mair first introduced the cartel party thesis, claiming that parties have increasingly 
alienated from society and migrated towards the state (Katz & Mair, 1994). In many 
countries, the levels of affiliation with political parties have declined significantly and 
membership figures have dropped. This has led to heated debates in political science literature 
on the assumed crisis or even redundancy of political parties. Several authors have argued that 
political parties have alienated from the citizens and are no longer able to fulfill their 
representative and legitimizing function (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Mair & Van Biezen, 
2001; Scarrow, 1996; Webb, 1995; Whiteley & Seyd, 1998).  
Local party branches are strongly affected by these evolutions as they suffer first from the 
declining membership figures and the alleged crisis of parties. Hence, several authors 
consider local party branches as increasingly irrelevant in contemporary - highly centralized 
and professionalized - cartel parties (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001; Webb, 1995). Other authors 
however, stress that local parties continue to play a central role in linking the citizens with the 
process of government. They provide the national party with legitimacy and the impression of 
a large rank and file; they organize campaign activities for supra-local elections which cannot 
be replaced by a professional headquarter and media specialists (producing and delivering 
leaflets, canvass voters, …). In between elections, they provide party members with benefits 
and incentives to encourage political participation and intra-party democracy. Moreover, local 
5 
 
party sections socialize party members into the parties’ values and organizational structures 
and allow them to gain political experience and test their motivation and aptitude for higher-
level office functions (Clark, 2004; Copus & Erlingsson, 2013).  
These opposing views on the relevance of local parties reflect their janus-faced character. 
Local parties assume two distinct political roles for which they need to look in opposite 
directions (Clark, 2004; Geser, 1999). They not only constitute the party on the ground of 
national parties - implementing a range of tasks to serve the national party goals – but also 
engage in local politics, which entails different - locally-oriented tasks. Local parties also 
recruit candidates to participate in local elections, aim to provide politicians for local 
government and engage in local policy-making. It can be assumed that the former role of 
party agency is in decline as the position of the party on the ground has altered in favor of the 
central party leadership, yet, no indications point to a decline in local parties’ latter role as 
participants in local politics. On the contrary, the relevance of local parties in this latter role 
remains pertinent and is even argued to increase as institutional reforms, combined with a 
shift towards governance networks, have increasingly politicized the local policy level (Geser, 
1999). Moreover, the recent cartelization tendency has been associated with an increasingly 
autonomous position of local parties. Yet, Copus and Erlingsson (2012) take a more critical 
stance and consider elitism and power concentration in local party groups as the local 
counterpart of the national party crisis. They argue that party members and citizens are 
gradually excluded from effective input to local politics and ‘local political power becomes 
concentrated in the hands of fewer party members and ultimately in the local elite of 
councilors’ (Copus & Erlingsson, 2012).  
By analyzing the organizational strength of local lists in Flanders in comparison to their 
national competitors in local election, this paper aims to contribute to our academic 
comprehension of the partisan character of these lists. Deschouwer & Rihoux (2008) have 
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examined how local party branches in Belgium are organized and their findings confirmed the 
general erosion of local party branches as foundations of national parties. Most local party 
branches in Belgium maintain a highly formalized party structure, but are equally confronted 
with declining membership figures and demonstrate a decreasing activity rate. The authors 
argue that formal party structures subsist for they are inherited from the past, but that local 
parties are less and less the local fundaments of national parties and instead develop their own 
local political logic, often focused on local elections. Furthermore, they established loosening 
statutory relationships between local party branches and national party centers, confirming the 
evolution towards stratarchical party structures (Deschouwer & Rihoux, 2008).  
These findings also confirm that the de facto modus operandi of local parties can deviate 
significantly from the formal arrangements as provided by the national party, which are 
complemented with informal rules (Fabre, 2010; M. Reiser & Vetter, 2011). The subsequent 
analysis aims to benchmark the organizational features of local candidate lists with these 
findings.  
3. The institutional context of Flanders 
In comparative literature, Belgium is considered as representative for the southern/Franco 
tradition and local government is generally conceived as the eminence of local community 
(inducing territorial fragmentation) with a rather limited role in public service and direct 
access to central power. (Copus, C., Wingfield, M., Steyvers, S. & Reynaert, H.; 2012). Local 
elections are held every 6 years and are typified by a high permissiveness in terms of 
candidacy
i
. Although there is no formal electoral threshold, the proportional Imperiali formula 
for seat distribution slightly increases the factual threshold
ii
 (Van der Kolk, 2007). Belgium is 
also an example of consensual local democracy from a wider perspective (De Rynck, 
Wayenberg, Steyvers & Pilet, 2010). Proportional representation leads to a multiparty system, 
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usually with various parties in government as well as in opposition and executive power is 
often shared in coalitions of different parties. Whereas local elections compose the council, 
monistic relations exist with an executive of the collegiate type (college of mayor and 
alderman).  
As in other Western democracies, national regional parties
2
 play an important role in 
Flanders’ local politics, but local lists continue to give a distinct place-bound flavor to local 
politics (Wille & Deschouwer; 2007). Ever since the municipal mergers in 1976, local 
candidate lists are found in approximately 70% of the Flemish communalities, with peaks of 
80% after the turn of the century. These peaks are attributed to the arrival of new parties and 
the fragmentation of the political landscape stimulating additional cartels
iii
 (Steyvers & De 
Ceuninck, 2013). Additionally, Heyerick & Steyvers (2013) established that less than half of 
all the candidate lists in Flanders that participated under a non-national name at the communal 
elections of 2006 and 2012 were actually independent from national parties. The majority was 
found to have partial or implicit links to national parties in the form of pre-electoral alliances 
involving national party branches or extended and supported candidate lists with a local(ized) 
profile but with explicit or implicit references to a national party. 
4. Non-national actors in local politics 
Despite the recent awareness of the continued relevance of non-national actors in local 
elections, academic insights on their role in local politics - and their organizational 
characteristics - remains confined. While traditional local party branches are generally 
considered as institutionalized long-term organizations with a stable organizational structure 
(Saiz & Geser, 1999), the organizational strength of non-national lists is subject of academic 
                                                          
2
 Due to the emergence of regionalist parties and the proceeding reform of the Belgian state towards a federal 
polity, former unitary national parties split into a Flemish and French faction, implying a regionalized space of 
party competition in Flanders and Wallonia. 
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discord. On the one hand; independent local lists have been criticized for being short-term, 
weakly structured political groups with little representative accountability (Soos, 2005; 
Steyvers et al., 2008), while other authors have argued that this traditional perception of 
independent local lists as parochial or folkloristic occurrences is erroneous as these lists have 
evolved over time and diverge less from their national counterparts than previously assumed 
(M.  Reiser & Holtmann, 2008; Reynaert & Steyvers, 2004; Van Tilburg & Tops, 1990). 
Empirical evidence to substantiate any of these assumptions is scarce and distorted by the 
unsatisfactory dichotomous distinction between national party lists and ‘independent’ 
candidate lists. Scholars agree that the general label of independent local lists covers a highly 
varied content, but methodological concerns (comparability, lack of practical classification 
models, aggregated perspective) often impel them to apply imperfect nominal or juridical 
criteria to juxtapose independent local lists to national party lists. Yet, several scholars have 
referred to the occurrence of pseudo-local lists, hidden party lists or other concealed sub-
species which can neither be considered as independent, nor as fully national lists (Dudzinska, 
2008; Göhlert et al., 2008; Heyerick & Steyvers, 2013; Steyvers et al., 2008). Moreover, the 
presence of local lists in Belgium has been attributed to the increased attractiveness of pre-
electoral alliances and localized party branches (Heyerick & Steyvers, 2013; Verthé & 
Deschouwer, 2011). Hence, the simplified binary distinction between (independent) local lists 
and national (party) lists neglects a variety of border cases and hampers academic knowledge-
building on the differentiated meaning of non-national lists for local politics.  
To develop a comprehensive understanding of the partisan character of local candidate lists 
and avoid any conceptual confusion, I will further use the term ‘non-national lists’ to refer to 
‘all candidate lists that participate in local elections with a label deviating from the labels 
used by nationally organized parties’. The prefix ‘non-national’ refers to their nominal 
dissociation from national parties without a priori assuming independence from national 
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parties, while he term ‘lists’ likewise makes no a priori assumptions about the extent to which 
these lists behave like political parties. Moreover, I will distinguish between associated 
candidate lists, cartel lists and independent candidate lists.  
- Associated candidate lists (extended party lists and supported lists) have been initiated 
by local party branches in their aim to involve independent candidates and attract 
additional votes. Their local(ized) label reflects some distance towards the party, but 
these lists maintain explicit or implicit links with the national party. 
- Local cartel lists are pre-electoral alliances between different local political actors. 
They contain at least one, but mostly two or even more local party branches, often 
supplemented with several independent candidates.  
- Independent local lists have no explicit nor implicit links to the national party level 
and have no liabilities as subunit of a national party. 
5. Research design 
This paper aims to assess the extent to which non-national lists in Flanders assume the 
organizational functions generally attributed to local parties by analyzing the organizational 
strength of the different types of non-national lists. Following Gibson et al., I will conceptual 
distinguish between organizational complexity and organizational capacity as two main 
components of organizational strength. Organizational complexity denotes the formalized 
nature of the procedures for interaction between the different components of the organization 
to engage in sustainable party activity, while organizational capacity
3
 refers to the activity 
level of the party organization or the stability and frequency of political activities (Gibson, 
Cotter, Bibby, & Huckshorn, 1985). 
                                                          
3
 Identified as programmatic capacity by Gibson et al., but I prefer the term organizational capacity to avoid 
confusion with the programmatic functions of local parties, referring to their policy preferences.  
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To empirically assess both components of organizational strength, a mixed methods-approach 
is adopted. In recent decades, mixed methods research - combining elements of qualitative 
and quantitative research designs - is increasingly popular and has even been considered as a 
‘third methodological movement’ (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & 
Turner, 2007; Morgan, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Traditionally, qualitative and 
quantitative research have been linked to distinct, incompatible paradigms based on 
philosophical assumptions concerning ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’. More recently however, 
‘pragmatism’ has been put forward as additional research paradigm (Morgan, 2007), which 
values both objective and subjective knowledge and uses diverse methodological approaches 
based on ‘what works’ to address specific research questions. Rather than by ontological and 
epistemological positions, pragmatists are guided by practical and applied research 
philosophy to make methodological decisions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). This analysis of 
the organizational strength of non-national lists in Flanders can be situated in this pragmatist 
paradigm, combining qualitative and quantitative methods as the two components of 
organizational strength demand for different methodological approaches. We have argued 
above that local party organizations are often characterized by the co-occurrence of formal 
and informal organizational arrangements and procedures. In-depth qualitative analysis seems 
most appropriate to analyze such complex organizational structures, while the nature and 
frequency of party activity can best be established based on survey data. Both approaches 
offer different but complementary data on the organizational strength of non-national 
candidate lists in Flanders. Different mixed methods designs can be distinguished in literature, 
but a parallel convergent design is most appropriate for the current research objective. In a 
parallel convergent design, qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis occurs 
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concurrently but independent from one another and the results are merged into an overall 
interpretation (Creswell & Clark, 2011).  
The qualitative analysis of the organizational complexity of the three types of non-national 
lists in Flanders is based on in-depth interviews with list headers of a selection of 22 non-
national lists in Flanders, spread over different types of non-national lists
4
, involving local 
cartel lists, associated lists and independent candidate lists. Two independent series of data 
collection occurred. A first wave of interviews took place by the end of 2010 with a focus on 
independent local lists that have participated at the 2006 local elections. The second phase of 
data collection took place by the end of 2012 focusing more on pseudo-local lists in the 2012 
local elections. These in-depth interviews provided us with ‘thick descriptions’ concerning a 
variety of partisan characteristics of the cases, including their organizational structure and the 
co-occurrence of formal and informal arrangements. The software program NVivo provided a 
helpful tool to reduce, organize and analyse this enormous amount of qualitative data.  
The quantitative analysis of the organizational capacity of non-national lists is based on 
survey data, collected in 2014 for the purpose of a PhD research project on the role of non-
national lists in Flanders. An electronic questionnaire was send to all leading candidates of 
non-national lists in Flanders which have participated in the municipal election of October 
2012. After several monitoring processes, the data collection was closed with a final response 
rate of 53,6%. Table 1 demonstrates how this response rate is distributed over the different 
types of non-national lists.  
 
                                                          
4
 The theoretical sample is based on data from previous research on the horizontal and vertical decisional 
autonomy of non-national lists. As the interviews allowed a longitudinal approach and horizontal and vertical 
decisional autonomy is subject to change, the cases cannot be categorized into these different sub-types, but 
can evolve from one type to another. 
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total 
number of  
responses 
response 
rate 
associated lists 61 46,2% 
cartel lists 92 52,6% 
independent local list 106 50,7% 
Total 259 50,2% 
Table 1: response rate of the different types of candidate lists 
In the following sections, I will first elaborate on the empirical results of the qualitative 
analysis of the organizational complexity of the different types of non-national lists before 
turning to the quantitative analysis of their organizational capacity. 
6. Organizational complexity  
To analyze if and how different types of non-national lists combine traditional local party 
structures with specific organizational arrangements, this sections turns to the organizational 
reality of associated lists, local cartel lists and independent local lists.  
Deschouwer and rihoux (2008) have established that local party branches are organized by 
formal party structures, which are inherited from the traditional mass party model with a 
formal demarcation between the local party-on-the-ground (nationally registered members), 
the local party-in-central-office (formally elected board of governors) and the local party-in-
public-office (council group) and statutory defined interaction procedures. We can assume 
that associated lists and local cartel lists equally carry the organizational imprint of national 
parties, but that the traditional local party structures have been supplemented with specific 
organizational arrangements to structure the specific local partnerships concerned (with 
independent candidates or with other local parties). Independent candidate lists have no links 
to any national party and need to develop their organizational structures autonomously. Yet, 
they might equally be inspired by traditional party templates as local parties are also found to 
copy each other’s organizational practices (Deschouwer & Rihoux, 2008).  
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6.1 Associated lists 
The sample contains 7 associated lists5, all involving a number of independent candidates in 
addition to the party members on the list. The interviews revealed that most of these 
associated lists indeed combine traditional local party structures with informal organizational 
arrangements to integrate the independent candidates into the party organization. Only one 
case did not adapt its traditional organizational structure and maintained a formal demarcation 
between the different organizational faces of the local party (members, board, council group): 
‘Council meetings take place every fourth Thursday of the month. We have a council group 
meeting on the preceding Monday and on Tuesday we present our plans to the board of 
governors which is composed of representatives of the local associations of the party. […] 
The regular members are mainly involved through festivities’ (case 20). The independent 
candidates on the list mainly served to attract some additional votes, but showed no further 
interest to remain involved in the party. They had no prominent place on the list and did not 
get elected and quickly disappeared from the scene after the elections.  
The other five analyzed associated lists did adapt their party structures to accommodate 
independent candidates after the elections. These independent candidates are only interested 
in one of the two faces assumed by local parties as they are willing to engage for the local 
political project of a local party branch, but are reluctant to affiliate with a national party. The 
data reveal that disconnecting these two party faces enables local party branches to involve 
independent candidates in their local role, while supra-local party activities remain confined 
to party members. Two organizational strategies can be distinguished to disconnect these two 
local party faces: assimilation and differentiation.  
                                                          
5
 One case was an extended party list of the VU in 2000, but with the disappearance of the VU, they molted in 
an independent group. This list was eliminated from this analysis for the data mainly concerns the later 
independent organization. 
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Two cases in the sample have adopted the first strategy and assimilated the independent 
candidates by unlocking the formal party organs and shifting attention to local policy issues. 
Their role as agency of the national party has been put on the backburner. Supra-local party-
political issues are rarely discussed in the local group, but the party members in the group 
remain involved in national party activities through direct communication, without 
intermediation of the local branch. The national party is considered the ‘sugar aunt’ of the list 
for their local activities remain supported by the national party center.  
Both cases are organized on a traditional basis, with registered party members and a formal 
board of governors, but these established party organs have been unlocked to accommodate 
the independent candidates and other interested sympathizers: ‘If people are interested, they 
can come by and join the board. But what’s in a name, the board is just a group of people’ 
(case 10).  Similarly, local party activities have been opened up to non-party members. One 
case even set up a parallel membership structure of the list in addition to the nationally 
registered party members, although with a less formal character: ‘Last meeting we realized 
that we forgot to ask a membership fee, but normally we have about 30 paying members and 
several non-paying members who regularly attend our meetings’. Both cases seem to highly 
value openness and transparency in the local policy debate and aim to maximize the 
involvement of involved citizens to formulate local policy preferences. Hence, in these cases, 
the assimilation of non-party members into the conventional local party structures resulted in 
informal organizational structures - grafted upon the traditional party structures - in which the 
party-on-the-ground, the party-in-central-office and the party in public office have been 
unlocked and coalesce into one single group of people with a joint political project for the 
locality: ‘Our  representatives do not meet separately. We are an open group, we hope that as 
many people are present to raise questions and hear our agenda and participate in the 
decisions’ (case 10).   
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The three other associated lists adopted a different strategy to accommodate the independent 
candidates. Instead of unlocking the traditional party structures and focusing on local policy 
issues, these cases have split up the two party roles and assigned them to two separate 
organizational structures. A clear functional and organizational differentiation is made 
between the local party and the list, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in people. The local 
party concentrates on its role as agency of the national party with a focus on member 
activities and supra-local party issues, while the group of candidates (party-members and 
independent) is exclusively concerned with local policy issues, as illustrated by the following 
quote:  
‘Interviewer: So there is a difference between the work of the list and that of the party? 
Respondent: Yes, and we try to keep that strictly separated […]. The [local] party will never 
assume a party-political stance on local policy issues but gave its mandate to the list […].The 
[local] party rather considers strategic, long-term issues and organizes socio-cultural 
activities for the members’ (case 14).’  
The local party has a formal and closed organizational structure with a paying membership, an 
elected board of governors and regular general meetings. The list on the other hand assembles 
independents and party-members on the list and concerns an informal organization without 
members nor a board of governors. In two cases the list coincides with the council group, as 
all candidates on the list received some office function (mayor, aldermen, councilors, social 
welfare councilors). In the other case with less office functions, the council group equally 
forms the nucleus of the list with monthly meetings to prepare council meetings. Additionally, 
the non-elected candidates are invited on a regular basis to discuss past and future council 
work and provide their input.  
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Notwithstanding this clear organizational and functional distinction between the local party 
and the list, these two organizational entities are interlinked through considerable personnel 
overlap as the local party’s board contains several candidates / office holders. Yet, the list – 
and particularly the council group - seems to assume a dominant and autonomous position. 
The local party is mainly considered as a source of input and support for the council group: 
‘Some of the candidates on the list, like myself, are also part of the local party board, but 
there are also people who are not interested to join the party board […]. If the local party 
perceives any problems, these are passed on to us. The party doesn’t take any decisions. […]. 
We (the list) take the decisions because we contain alderman and councilors’ (case  21). 
Moreover, the list has a separate budget – fed by the local party – which enhances its 
autonomous position.  
Remarkably, the respondents indicate that independent candidates often affiliate to the party 
after some time: ‘we started out with about 50% independent candidates on the list, but 
elected or appointed candidates soon become party members’ (case 14). Although the 
involvement of independent candidates is the initial argument for a functional distinction 
between the local party and the list, this differentiation strategy mainly seems to increase the 
autonomy of the party council group to take local policy decisions without the formal checks 
and balances provided in traditional local party structures.  
6.2 Local cartel list 
The organizational analysis of local cartel lists is based on 7 cases that have formed a pre-
electoral alliance in 2006
6
. The interviews reveal that these cases equally combine traditional 
local party structures with specific organizational arrangements to organize the cooperation 
                                                          
6
 The sample contains 10 cases which have (at least once) engaged in a pre-electoral alliance during the period 
analyzed (2000-2012).  Three of these cartels were only just starting up when the interviews took place in 2012. 
These interviews contained insufficient information concerning the organizational features of the cartel and 
were omitted from this analysis.  
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between the different cartel partners. The individual party branches maintain their traditional 
organizational structure with a formal board of governors, registered party members and 
formal, statutory procedures for interaction to assume both their role as party agency and as 
local political actor. Most cartel lists also contain some independent candidates but these have 
no separate formal organizational structure: ‘We actually consist of three parties in one cartel 
and two of them have a separate board and mandatories and members paying their 
membership fees, … Only the independents are not organized like that’. Only in one case, the 
independents on the cartel list form a distinct organization, but without any formal structure: 
‘We are a small group of about 8 people and meet monthly. We have no formal board nor 
anything like that, only a president, a secretary and a treasurer, but that’s more an informal 
matter’ (case 15).  
In addition to these distinct party organizations, the cooperation between the individual cartel 
partners occurs in an overarching organizational cartel structure, which alters with the 
electoral cycle. Before the elections, the terms and conditions of the alliance are negotiated in 
a temporary organizational structure with representatives from the different (potential) cartel 
partners. Local party leaders and top candidates of the individual cartel partners play a 
prominent role in these temporary negotiating structures. In two cases, this working group 
also involved representatives of the national party centers(s) to strengthen the position of 
unexperienced local party representatives: ‘The top candidate of our cartel partner was an 
incumbent councilor but with limited political experience. He was assisted in the cartel 
negotiations by a Flemish MP and the vice-president of his national party’ (case 11). These 
temporary working group have no formal structure nor formal procedures for interaction, but 
the resulting cartel agreements receive a formal status and are perceived as binding.  
After the elections, the organizational arrangements to structure the collaboration within the 
alliance alters. Only one cartel list in the sample merely concerned a joint candidate list with 
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no engagements for further collaboration after the elections. Hence, the privileged relationship 
between the cartel partners ended and each party refocused on its own role in council. The 
other alliances in the sample received a more permanent character but both the focus and the 
locus of the collaboration shifted. Once the electoral dice has been thrown and the elected and 
appointed officials are identified, the collaboration refocuses on a joint council strategy – 
instead of a joint electoral strategy – led by the joint council group.  
For governing cartels, this further collaboration closely resembles conventional coalition 
practices and becomes concentrated in the group of executive officials in the College of 
Mayor and Aldermen. This is especially true for the two cartel lists in the sample with a single 
majority with no other coalition partners to consider. The Mayor and Aldermen meet weekly 
to decide on local policy measures, which are then brought to the council. The cartel 
councilors form a joint council group and gather prior to the council meetings to take notice 
of the council agenda and receive ‘voting instructions’. Hence, the collaboration between 
councilors from the different cartel parties is limited for they have little political levers and 
are mainly expected to support the decisions of the College. In one case the separate council 
group meetings have even been omitted during the course of the legislature and the 
cooperation between the cartel / coalition partners became exclusively located in the College.  
Similarly, the post-electoral collaboration between cartel partners in a larger coalitions - with 
more parties than only those involved in the cartel – differs little from conventional coalition 
work and is concentrated in the College. One respondent clearly states that his relationship 
with the cartel partner does not differ from his relationship with the other coalition partner for 
a coalition works ‘in collegiality’: ‘In a coalition government, all partners support the policy 
decisions. You only bring consensual issues on the council agenda and in the absence of 
consensus the agenda item is postponed’ (case 11). In another case, the executive officers of 
the cartel partners do form a distinctive group and convene separately to prepare the College 
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meetings and align their position towards the other coalition partner in government. Although 
the joint council work of governing cartel partners is centered in the College, the local party 
organizations keep a close eye on this collaboration. They attend the joint council group 
meetings and the local party presidents are often consulted informally if no consensus is 
found within the college on specific issues. In one case the cartel partners even organize 
occasional joint board meetings to discuss specific policy issues.  
For local cartel list with a legislative role in council, the post-electoral cartel collaboration is 
concentrated in the council group and determined by the decisions of the local government: 
‘Council meetings take place every third Tuesday of the month and the agenda is made 
available 10 days before, so we meet on Wednesdays to determine our position and additional 
agenda items’ (case 22). Again, these council group meetings are attended by the respective 
party presidents. They are also accessible to the non-elected candidates of the lists, although 
these show limited interest (except in the prospect of upcoming elections when new people 
come forward).  
We can conclude that local cartel lists contain a multilayered organizational structure with a 
clear distinction between the local party branches involved in these lists and the alliance. The 
local party branches maintain their own formal organizational structure to assume their 
twofold role as national party agency ánd as local political actor. Yet this latter role is shared 
with other local political actors in an umbrella structure with a more informal character, 
without members, nor a formal board of governors, nor formal procedures for interaction. 
Before the elections, the operation of the alliance is focused on a joint electoral strategy with a 
prominent role for the local party organizations. After the elections, the focus of the 
collaboration shifts towards a joint council strategy and the joint council group assumes a 
more prominent position in the collaboration, although the local party leadership remains 
closely involved. Hence, the council group in local cartel lists assume a less autonomous 
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position than has been established above for the associated lists as the functional distinction 
between the list and the party organizations is less clear.   
6.3 Independent candidate lists 
In contrast to the other list types discussed above, independent candidate lists assume only 
one of the two roles generally ascribed to local parties. They participate in local political life 
but are not concerned with supra-local party politics. The organizational analysis of 
independent lists is based on 8 cases. Most of these cases have an informal organizational 
structure without clear distinction between members, party leaders and councilors. Most 
respondents do not conceive their independent lists as a local ‘party’, but rather as a ‘local 
political association’ with an active core group of engaged citizens. These lists maintain an 
open character with little formal procedures for interaction. Two cases did mention a formal 
membership structure, but membership is less closed and sympathizers are welcome to join 
the core group meetings or any other activities of the list.  
The organizational structure of these independent list seems influenced by the size of the core 
group of activists and their position in council. Three of the analyzed cases only contain about 
a handful of people and have no representatives elected in council. These lists have no active 
council role, but maintain a limited activity level to monitor local policy and sustain some 
visibility in the municipality: ‘You could say that we are a movement with four people in the 
core and then several sympathizers, readers of our pamphlets’ (case 8). The small scale of 
these cases seems to make any organizational arrangements to structure internal interaction 
redundant
7
.  
Independent lists with an active role in council generate more enthusiasm and involves a 
larger core group of activists. These lists assume a more comprehensive political role and 
                                                          
7
 One case concerns a one man’s list and hence involves only one person without any interaction. 
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engage in a broader range of political activities. Several cases have created some formal 
positions to organize and structure their activities (chairman, treasurer, secretary), yet the 
allocation of these positions is not formalized and the councilors, party leaders and members / 
sympathizers form one single group with no separate meetings or activities: ‘We only have a 
governing board to take care of financial management and to implement actions, yet there is 
no elected board of governors for there are no party members. We are not a party, we are a 
team, an anarchist collective and anyone interested can join us’ (case 18).  
One list in the sample however more closely resembles a local party organization for it does 
organizationally differentiate between the party in public office and the party in central office:  
‘We do have an organigram, with a core group - or an executive committee - of seven people, 
which considers the general strategy of the list. This group contains a president and the two 
council group chairpersons and some non-elected persons. Additionally we have a broader 
policy group involving all councilors and some other sympathizers which gathers monthly to 
prepare the council meetings’ (case 3). The first group can be considered as a closed party-in-
central-office, while the latter group concerns an open party-in-public-office. A formal party-
on-the-ground is lacking for the list has no members, but they can rely on a large informal 
rank and file. It concerns a longstanding list with substantial governing experience. 
We can conclude that the independent lists in our sample in general have less complex and 
less formal organizational structures than associated or cartel lists which are organized at 
multiple levels, combining their role as party agency with their role in local politics. 
Independent lists are only concerned with local politics and do not require any organizational 
arrangements to combine these two roles. Some independent lists have no organizational 
structure at all, while others have merely a simple informal structure and still others have 
adopted some traditional organizational characteristics. The organizational complexity of 
independent lists seems to vary according to their size and position in council.  
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7. Organizational capacity  
To further assess the organizational strength of non-national lists in Flanders and establish 
whether these lists should be considered as short-term, underactive and weakly structured 
political groups or as durable and active institutionalized political organizations, this section 
considers the organizational capacity the different types of non-national lists. The survey data 
allow to analyze their ability to maintain a stable activity level and sustainably engage in 
political activities beyond elections. Two indications of the organizational capacity of non-
national lists will be considered: the age of the organization and their activity level. 
7.1 Age of the organization 
The list headers of non-national lists were asked to indicate when their list first participated in 
municipal elections with their current name. Table 2 (left part) summarizes the results and 
indicates that a majority of the three types of non-national lists participated for the first time 
with their current name in the most recent municipal elections of 2012. Only a small minority 
of all non-national lists (12,9%) has been electorally active for more than three successive 
elections. The differences between associated lists, local cartel lists and independent lists are 
limited and proved statistically not significant. At first sight these figures seem to confirm that 
non-national lists in Flanders are predominantly short-term and unstable organizations. 
However, an additional question inquired if a related predecessor of the lists has participated 
in prior municipal elections under a different name. Nearly half of the respondents indicated 
that this was indeed the case, which offers a different image of the organizational stability of 
these lists. Including these precursors decreases the share of actually novel lists to about one 
third (33,7%), while nearly 35% have been participating in elections since before 2000, as 
illustrated in the right side of table x. Independent lists contain slightly more novel 
organizations, while supported lists most often concern older organizations which have been 
electorally active since before 2000. The majority of the cartel lists have been established in 
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2000 or 2006. Although these differences in age between cartel lists, associated lists and 
independent lists are limited, they are statistically significant and indicate that independent 
lists more often concern unstable organizations (V= 0,157*).  
  
With current name forerunners incl. 
In 2012 
In 2000 or 
2006 
Before 
2000 
In 2012 
In 2000 or 
2006 
Before 
2000 
non-national lists 61,2% 25,9% 12,9% 33,7% 31,3% 34,9% 
Associated lists 67,2% 21,3% 11,5% 33,9% 23,7% 42,4% 
Cartel lists 61,1% 32,2% 6,7% 28,1% 44,9% 27,0% 
Independent lists 57,7% 23,1% 19,2% 38,5% 24,0% 37,5% 
Table 2: first electoral participation of Flemish non-national lists 
7.2 Activity level 
In addition to their first electoral participation, the activity level of non-national lists indicates 
their organizational capacity. Non-national lists – as local party branches - can engage in a 
wide variety of political activities, addressing different target audiences. Some activities only 
involve a limited group of active core members, while other activities address a more 
inclusive group of (active and passive) members or an even wider public of sympathizers or 
interested citizens (political debates, festivities, social events, …). Moreover, local parties 
often keep their rank and file informed about political realizations and upcoming activities 
through diverse communication channels.  
The survey results show that not all non-national lists engage in party activities beyond 
election periods. They turn to a non-active state after elections and can therefore be 
considered as latent parties. One out of five of the non-national lists in Flanders can be as 
such identified. Although the differences between different types of non-national lists proved 
not significant, table 3 shows that associated lists least often concern latent lists, while 
independent lists most often indicated that they do not engage in any party activity beyond 
elections.  
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latent lists 
non-national lists 20,6% 
associated lists 15,3% 
cartel lists 18,2% 
independent lists 25,7% 
Table 3: share of dormant non-national lists 
Hence, the majority of non-national lists do maintain a certain activity level in between 
elections. The respondents were asked to indicate how frequently their list organized 1) board 
or core group meetings to prepare council work or organize other party activities; 2) a general 
meeting for all (active and passive) members / sympathizers; 3) communication with their 
members through a members magazine; and 4) public activities for members or sympathizers. 
Based on these results, the share of lists which engage in these activities on a regular basis 
could be identified.  
Table 4 summarizes the results and demonstrates that a majority of all non-national lists 
regularly (at least once a month) organizes core group meetings and regularly (at least several 
times a year) communicates with members/sympathizers. Nearly half of all non-national lists 
regularly organize general meetings for all members (at least once a year), also about half 
have at least two public activities a year (49,6%). The differences between associated lists, 
cartel lists and independent lists are statistically not significant, but as illustrated in table 4, 
the share of independent lists with a high activity level is substantially lower in all four 
activity types (table 3).   
  N 
regular core 
group meetings  
regular 
member 
meetings 
regular 
communication 
regular public 
activities 
non-national lists 259 63,2% 48,8% 60,9% 49,6% 
associated lists 61 69,6% 52,5% 69,5% 59,3% 
cartel lists 92 62,2% 53,4% 63,6% 52,3% 
independent lists 106 59,8% 42,6% 53,5% 41,6% 
Table 4: share of non-national lists with high active level for different activity types 
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To establish the overall organizational activity level of the different types of non-national 
lists, these four activity domains have been integrated, allowing to distinguish - in addition to 
the previously identified latent organizations - between dynamic organizations with a high 
and stable activity level (regular activities in at least three of the above mentioned activity 
fields) and indolent organizations which do engage in some party activities in between 
electoral periods, but in a less comprehensive and rigorous manner. The distribution of non-
national lists between these three organizational types is illustrated in table 5, demonstrating 
that slightly more than half of all non-national lists can be identified as dynamic. Independent 
lists contain the least dynamic lists, although these differences again proved not statistically 
significant. About 27% of non-national lists in Flanders are identified as indolent lists with 
only a limited level of party activity in between election periods.  
 N latent indolent dynamic 
non-national lists 248 20,6% 27,4% 52,0% 
supported lists 59 15,3% 27,1% 57,6% 
cartel lists 88 18,2% 26,1% 55,7% 
independent lists 101 25,7% 28,7% 45,5% 
Table 5: organizational capacity of different types of local candidate lists 
It can be assume that the organizational capacity of non-national lists is influenced by their 
electoral performance and their role in council. Council work is generally considered a 
priority for local party organizations and most party activities relate to the work in council. 
The more extensive this role in council, the broader the range of possible council-related 
activities (involving members, informing the public, aligning internally, …). Without any 
representatives in council, party life risks to fade away together with the lack of tangible 
political leverage. Table 6 confirms that non-national lists which have passed the 
representation threshold more often have a high activity level, while non-national lists without 
representatives in council more often concern dormant or indolent lists (Cramer’s 
26 
 
V=0.259***). The difference between lists in opposition and governing lists is less obvious 
(table 6). 
 non-national lists 
 dormant dynamic indolent 
Total 20,6% 52,0% 27,4% 
in government 13,5% 60,7% 25,8% 
in opposition 18,2% 60,9% 20,9% 
not represented 38,8% 16,3% 44,9% 
Cramer's V 0,256*** 
Table 6: organizational capacity and role in council of non-national lists 
The direction of this correlation between role in council and programmatic activity however is 
not quite clear. It can also be assumed that non-national lists with a low activity level are less 
rooted in the community and might therefore attract less voters and encounter more 
difficulties to surpass the representation threshold. More research is needed to delve into the 
specific causes of the low activity levels of non-national lists. 
8. Conclusions 
Based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, this paper has assessed the 
organizational strength of non-national lists in Flanders to establish whether these lists can be 
considered as short-term, weakly structured political groups or rather as durable and 
institutionalized political organizations. The results show that both organizational complexity 
and organizational capacity differ between and within the different types of non-national lists 
and we can conclude that non-national lists in local elections represent a miscellaneous 
phenomenon in local politics with diverging organizational features.  
Local cartel lists and associated lists can be considered organizational derivatives of local 
party branches, while independent lists show less overlap with traditional local party 
organizations. Associated lists and local cartel lists are found to have a complex, multilayered 
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organizational structure, both containing pieces of traditional local party structures, which 
have been excavated or supplemented with informal customized organizational arrangements 
to combine their role as party agency with their role as participants in local politics. 
Compared to traditional local parties the organizational distinction between members, 
councilors and party leadership is less prominent, while the distinction between local and 
supra-local competences is strongly anchored in the adapted organizational structures. Supra-
local and party political issues remain the exclusive competence of the traditional party 
structures, while local policy issues are largely detached from the national party and assigned 
to additional - less formalized - organizational structures. Especially for associated lists, these 
customized organizations structures seem to allow local party branches to circumnavigate the 
statutory link with the national party and assume a more autonomous position in local politics 
with a dominant role for the council groups. Cartel structures also attribute a dominant role to 
the council group although the local party branches remain involved in the council strategy. 
Hence, these findings confirm the general evolution towards stratarchical party structures and 
associated lists can be considered as an extension of this evolution (Bolleyer, 2012). 
Moreover, the findings equally confirm the increased concentration of local powers in local 
council groups as established by Copus and Erlingsson (Copus & Erlingsson, 2012). 
Independent local lists proved weaker organizations. Their organizational structure is less 
formal and less complex and they demonstrate lower activity levels. Hence, both 
organizational complexity and organizational capacity of independent lists are weaker. Yet, a 
substantial part of the independent lists equally indicate stable activity levels and can be 
identified as dynamic organizations, depending on their electoral success and position in 
council. Without representatives in council, the commitment of activists to engage in political 
activities in between elections is restricted and the limited scope of non-represented lists does 
not entail any (complex) organizational structures nor a broad activity level. Moreover, 
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previous research revealed that independent lists in Flanders more often fail to surpass the 
electoral threshold and enter local council, while local cartel lists and associated lists have 
more electoral guarantees when entering the electoral arena. Hence, independent lists more 
often lack the political need to organize on a more stable basis.   
This paper has focused on the organizational characteristics of non-national lists as a crucial 
civic party function. To develop a comprehensive understanding of the partisan character of 
(different types of) non-national lists, further examination of other traditional party functions 
is required.  
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i
 Anyone can propose a list with one or more candidates, which then has to be submitted by a resigning councillor or by a 
certain (limited) number of voters. 
ii
 This electoral threshold depends on the amount of council seats to be distributed. In the smallest communalities this 
threshold can reach 20% of the votes, while in the big cities in Belgium the threshold is a about 1%. 
iii
 Although the term ‘cartel’ generally has another connotation in political science (cfr the cartel party of Katz & Mair, 2006), 
the concept of ‘cartel lists’ is very familiar in Belgium (Flanders as well as Wallonia), referring to pre-electoral alliances in 
the form of joint candidate lists. 
